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Michał Buchowski
Poles exhibit contrasting attitudes towards absent Muslim refugees and physically 
present Ukrainian labor immigrants. Both groups have been historically seen as 
“Significant Others,” potentially perilous to the nation. Today, however, Muslims are 
rejected, while Ukrainians are accepted. This situation can be attributed to historical, 
ethnic, political, social, and economic factors, all of which are discussed here. The 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious superhomogeneity of Polish society affects the 
approach to the “culturally distant” Muslim migrants who were cynically rejected 
by the right-wing populist authorities during the 2015 refugee crisis. Economic 
necessity justifies the acceptance of the Ukrainians, who are perceived as culturally 
close. It is argued here that within the category of Significant Others, it is necessary 
to distinguish between Distant/Absent/Hostile and Familiar/Present/Tolerated 
Significant Others. 
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Introduction
In this article, I will interpret the contrasting attitudes of Poles and the Polish 
authorities with respect to two types of foreigner groups: (1) refugees, mostly 
Muslim “Significant Others,” a group generally geographically distant and, in 
practice, absent from the country, and (2) labor immigrants, an increasingly 
present group of “Familiar Others.” Significant Others “represent what the 
ingroup is not” (Triandafyllidou 2001, 33), typically “other nations or ethnic 
groups that are perceived to threaten the nation” (Triandafyllidou 1998, 594); 
they personify negative attributes rejected as unacceptable by a given group, to 
which these attributes presumably cannot be assigned, and for which they are 
viewed as inherently alien. Familiar Others, usually ethnic neighbors, though in 
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certain contexts also functioning as detested Significant Others, are nevertheless 
not only territorially close, but also share some parts of history. There is an 
ongoing interaction with members of this group, and therefore they are perceived 
as culturally similar. Although the actual experience of Poles with these two 
social groups, i.e. Muslims and Ukrainians, is radically different—respectively, 
one is empirically absent and the second is physically present—their comparison 
is justified by the assumption that their discursively created “representations 
are social facts” which act as “strong and effective forces” (Rabinow 1986, 241) 
affecting the perception of various types of Others. 
In order to elucidate these phenomena, I will provide data on the ethno-
religious composition of Poland’s highly homogeneous society, then give a short 
account of the attitudes of Poles toward these Others as well as of indicative 
events in recent years ensuing from xenophobic stereotypes, especially those 
related to Muslim believers. It is striking how hostile standpoints are towards 
generalized “Muslims,” whose presence in Polish society is negligible. The ‘refugee 
crisis’ of 2015 in Europe—deftly manipulated by populist politicians in the name 
of ensuring their nations’ security and cultural integrity, or even their survival—
engendered a ‘phantom Islamophobia’ rooted in historically shaped Orientalizing 
stereotypes. Despite a rise in racially tinted nationalism, perceptions of the much 
more numerous Ukrainian laborers are different from those of Muslims.
Poland: A Superhomogeneous Country—Ethnically, Linguistically, 
and Religiously
Steven Vertovec (2007) has argued that in recent decades many western and 
north-western European countries have become superdiverse as a result of their 
acceptance of immigrants. In contrast to these states, Poland may be called 
in ethnic, linguistic, and religious terms (even though not in several other 
aspects) a superhomogeneous country (Buchowski 2016, 53). According to the 
last census taken in 2011, out of 38.5 million citizens, 94.83 percent declared 
Polish nationality, and for 97.8 percent of them Polish was a language spoken at 
home.  Those claiming dual (i.e. Polish and another) nationality numbered eight 
hundred and seventy-one thousand (2.7 percent), while only five hundred and 
ninety-six thousand (1.55 percent) declared a single nationality other than Polish. 
One should also keep in mind that for technical reasons—for instance open 
refusal or lack of answer (Gołata 2013, 124)—for more than half a million people 
(1.35 percent) ethnicity was not determined (Wyniki 2012, 17-18; Struktura 
2015, 29). The state official statistical office summed up the situation thus: “The 
population with Polish national identification included altogether almost 37.394 
million people, which is 97.1 percent of Poland’s total inhabitants, while non-
Poles comprised almost 1.468 million, i.e., 3.8 percent” (ibid., 30).1 It can be safely 
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said that the ethnic landscape of the country’s citizenry is indeed, and not only by 
European standards, highly homogeneous.
This homogeneity is a consequence of the postwar reconstruction of Poland, 
which involved enormous border changes, as a result of which Poland lost the 
eastern lands of its prewar polity at the expense of the Soviet Union and gained 
a smaller amount of territory from a defeated Germany; a population exchange 
with the Soviet Union in the east; and, as agreed upon in the Potsdam Treaty, 
the removal of ethnic Germans from what are today Poland’s western, north-
western and north-eastern (former East Prussia) lands. Following war atrocities 
driven by a raging nationalist ideology, a homogeneous nation state appeared. It 
represented an ideal polity for the political forces in the region, one that would 
secure internal ethnic coherence and harmony (see Ther and Siljak 2001, esp. “Part 
I: Creating a Polish Nation State”).
After the Polish People’s Republic was established and population 
resettlement completed, the Iron Curtain’s isolationist migratory regime limited 
border crossings to a minimum, especially during the Stalinist period (in 
practical terms, until 1956). Later, several liberalizations of laws on cross-border 
movements were enacted, leading to exit migration of Polish citizens to the West. 
Migration opportunities were used above all by ethnic Germans, thanks in large 
part to a 1975 agreement signed between Poland and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, as a result of which several hundred thousand Germans, the so-called 
Späteaussidlers, left Poland (see Schmidt 2009), but also by Jews, both in the 
first decade after World War II, and under coercion following an anti-Semitic 
campaign in 1968 (see Stola 2006). Later, Polish labor and political migrants also 
left the country. For instance, between 1960 and 1980 the number of those who 
chose to emigrate permanently amounted to five hundred thousand (on average, 
twenty-five thousand a year), rising to four hundred thousand in 1989 alone (see 
Stola 2010). The reigning “closed door” policy and poor economic standards 
meant that immigration to Poland under communism was nearly nonexistent. 
Exceptions included so-called Polish repatriates from the Soviet Union, who were 
allowed to move to their “homeland” during the period of political relaxation 
after 1956, and some international students from “befriended Third World 
countries” and Palestine who decided to stay in Poland after completing their 
studies, as well as some Vietnamese students and laborers in the 1970s. In general, 
since World War II, these combined processes, involving both the recurring 
emigration of minorities and curbed immigration, systematically furthered the 
homogenization of the population in Poland.
After the collapse of the ancien régime in 1989, Poles were granted the 
freedom to travel. After Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU) on May 1, 
2004, the number of migrants to the “old EU-countries” and other European Free 
Trade Association countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) 
increased significantly. The overall number of Polish citizens dwelling abroad at 
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any given moment, both as permanent residents and as temporary or circular 
migrants, is calculated at the level of roughly 2.5 million, with 88 percent of them 
in Europe, and 83 percent in the EU alone (Kalwasiński 2019).
The situation with immigrants to Poland has also changed and evolved over 
the years. According to the census taken in 2011, only seventy-six thousand 
residents in Poland (0.2 percent of the population) were foreigners. This number 
did not reflect the reality on the ground. Even governmental agencies estimated 
that at that time the number should have been raised to three hundred and 
eighty thousand (1 percent) (Raport 2012, 96; Współpraca 2012, 9). Since 2011, 
when the census was conducted, things have changed a great deal. First, the 
number of immigrants to Poland has increased significantly. According to data 
from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
the number of foreign-born people in Poland in 2017 amounted to six hundred 
and ninety-six thousand, which represents 1.8 percent of the total population.2 
The war in the Donbas region and the occupation of Crimea brought about 
an economic crisis in Ukraine that led its citizens to seek job opportunities in 
more prosperous neighboring countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Poland. The latter accepted the largest number of Ukrainians (see 
Jóźwiak and Piechowska 2017). Despite the fact that “due to the predominantly 
temporary character of the migration, it is difficult to estimate the exact number 
of Ukrainian migrants residing in Poland” (Jaroszewicz 2018, 5), estimates placed 
the number at nine hundred thousand at the end of 2017. The OECD has stated 
that by accepting 1.1 million temporary migrants—with a legal stay of up to 
twelve months—Poland was first in the world, ahead of even the United States 
with seven hundred thousand and Germany with four hundred thousand, in 
terms of the number of transitory migrants (Business Insider 2019). According 
to the most recent estimates of the National Bank of Poland, the number of 
Ukrainians has risen to 1.3 million, among which three hundred thousand have 
work permits (Gazeta Wyborcza 2019). It is worth mentioning that over fifty 
thousand Polish citizens have a declared affiliation with the Ukrainian minority. 
All these numbers add up to 3 percent of the population residing in the country 
at any given moment. However, this most recent wave of migration to Poland 
from the east—and one should keep in mind that it is in principle temporary—
does not substantially change the fact that in comparison to other immigrant 
countries in Europe, the number of nonethnic Poles in Poland is relatively low, 
and the country remains essentially ethnically homogeneous.3 
The homogeneity of Polish society is also noticeable with regard to religious 
denomination. The 2011 census results are partial, since not all respondents 
are eager to answer questions regarded as personal (8.7 percent refused), and 
religious minority members are especially reluctant to do so. Among those 
answering, 96 percent declared that they were Roman Catholics (Struktura 2015, 
94-98); only four hundred and ninety-three thousand (1.3 percent) claimed other 
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denominations, with 2.4 percent stating that they were religiously indifferent or 
areligious.4 While these declarations reflected in many cases “cultural belonging,” 
and Sunday mass participation has dropped below 40 percent (Annuarium 
Statisticum 2016, 14-18), five thousand one hundred people (0.013 percent of 
those answering) declared that they are Muslims in the census (Struktura 2015, 
95). The number of Orthodox believers was over half a million, which made it the 
largest religious minority in Poland. Again, in relation to most other countries in 
the region, these numbers are patently low.5
Muslims in Poland 
Official census data reporting that there are only five thousand Muslims living 
in Poland underestimate their number. It is estimated that there are actually 
between twenty thousand (Kubicki 2006) and forty thousand (Stryjewski 2011, 
56). Still, this means that Muslims in Poland comprise at best 0.1 percent of the 
overall population. This small group is also internally differentiated (for a general 
overview see Pędziwiatr 2011a). One can distinguish here six subgroups: (1) 
Polish Tatars who settled in Polish territories as early as the 13th–14th centuries, 
and which are recognized as an ethnic minority by Polish law. According to the 
2011 census, a total of 1,916 persons declared Tatar nationality, among which 
only 665 listed it exclusively (Ludność 2013, 261). Dispersed across the country, 
the Tatar community in Poland has its roots in north-east Poland, close to the 
Belarussian border. They are linguistically assimilated (Chazbijewicz 2010, 301) 
and in non-religious respects are often socially unmarked. The Islamic faith 
and its rituals serve as their cultural diacritics. (2) “Old immigrants,” a group 
consisting of the descendants of several small waves of settlers between the 
18th century and World War II; these people are also largely integrated into 
mainstream society. (3) Graduates of Polish universities during the communist 
period and their offspring, mostly from Arab countries and Palestine (Pędziwiatr 
2011b, 171-74). (4) Refugees and asylum seekers escaping wars in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
and Syria (Marciniak 1997, 353-59). (5) Small investors, such as Turkish or North 
African entrepreneurs, often restaurant or bistro owners (see Adamowicz and 
Kochaniewicz 2012, 116-27; Nowaczek-Walczak 2012). Lastly, (6) a tiny group of 
local converts to Islam, largely ignored in analyses of Polish Muslims (exceptions: 
Boćkowski 2009, 43; Łojek-Magdziarz 2007).
The legal status and social perception of these groups vary. As mentioned 
earlier, Tatars are recognized as an ethnic minority as well as part of the 
nationwide society. They are subjected to the logic of hierarchical pluralism, a 
system of social relations admitting “diversity while making it clear which (ethnic/
religious) group is dominant and norm-defining” (Pasieka 2013, 58; 2015). In 
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general, minorities are tolerated as long as they remain low-key in the public 
sphere and do not demand recognition in a manner that challenges the majority’s 
unquestioned and unmarked domination. As an insignificant group numerically, 
Tatars are encompassed into the national imagery as proof of a now phantasmal 
“traditional Polish tolerance.” However, there is no connection between the 
tolerance exercised in the period of the multiethnic and multireligious Polish 
Kingdom before its collapse in 1795 and today’s attitudes and policies (Buchowski 
and Chlewińska 2012, 360). Those who settled in Poland during the communist 
period hold Polish citizenship, and many newcomers have a similar status or 
permanent residence permit.
One should keep in mind that since 1999, as a result of the two wars in 
Chechnya, eighty-six thousand Muslim war refugees have arrived in Poland. 
However, most of them have migrated further to western Europe and the 
Czech Republic or returned to the Russian Federation (Stryjewski 2011, 149-50). 
Between 2003 and 2014 alone, seventy-three thousand Russian citizens, mostly 
of Chechen ethnic background, applied for refugee status and found shelter in 
Poland (Stummer 2016). It is estimated that only three to five thousand (Pędziwiatr 
2011b, 173) or seven to eight thousand (Zuchowicz 2015) of them decided to stay 
in the country. This migration wave did not breed Islamophobia.6
Perceptions of Muslims by Poles
The reception of war refugees from Chechnya was positive because, as some 
authors have explained, Poles have a “mostly negative attitude towards Russia” 
and the country had its “own ‘experiences’ with the USSR.” This ignited solidarity 
with those suffering from Putin’s cruel policy towards this rebellious nation 
(Stummer 2016). This fact outshone other, often negative, perceptions of Muslims 
which were bolstered by the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center 
in New York City and several other assaults on civilian targets in Europe. This 
friendly attitude towards Chechens prevailed also despite general long-standing 
and widespread negative stereotyping of Muslims. As sociological surveys show, 
the word “Islam” evokes such associations as “terrorism,” “war,” “violence,” 
“aggression,” “fundamentalism,” “Islamists,” “Islamic radicals,” and ”fanaticism,” 
but also “poverty and backwardness.” Only 2 percent think more positively and 
connect Islam with “oriental or Arab culture” (Górak-Sosnowska 2006, 159-
60; Marek 2008, 38). In studies on attitudes towards other nationalities, Arabs, 
commonly concomitant with Muslims, have for years been consistently at the 
bottom of the list in terms of sympathy. For instance, in 2018, 65 percent of 
respondents disliked them, while 13 percent expressed positive sentiments. Next 
to them were Roma with 57 percent negative and 17 percent positive opinions 
(CBOS 2019, 2-3). Given the general absence of Muslims in Poland, this is 
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indeed a case of “phantom Islamophobia” (Włoch 2009, 65), a “phenomenon of 
strong anti-Muslim sentiments in the absence of a significant Muslim minority” 
(Pędziwiatr 2015, 145). 
In general, the Polish authorities have long been reluctant to accept refugees 
and asylum seekers. Since 1990 a mere four thousand applications for refugee 
status have been approved, which makes for an acceptance rate of just 2 percent. 
This reluctance regarding Others became conspicuous during and after the 
refugee crisis in 2015. In 2016, twelve thousand applications for refugee status 
were filed, mostly from Russia, and in the same year, just forty-four applications 
were approved (Pawłowska 2017).
In 2015, the right-wing, nationalist and populist7 Law and Justice Party 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), in coalition with two smaller rightist parties, 
won national elections. Alongside nationalism, hostility towards refugees and 
Islamophobia became this political camp’s trademarks. Migrant flows helped 
conservatives and traditionalists gain power—it was at least among the decisive 
factors that tipped the balance in their favor. Refugees have been presented by 
PiS not as victims of war or poverty, but as criminals. In a parliamentary speech 
just before the elections in 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of this right-
wing political grouping, proclaimed in post-truth fashion that fifty-four “sharia 
zones” where the state had no control existed in Sweden; citizens were afraid 
to hang the Swedish flag, and girls were fearful of wearing short skirts. In Italy, 
churches are supposedly used as toilets. Moreover, he claimed that immigrants 
brought cholera, dysentery, parasites, and protozoa. The Swedish embassy 
resolutely denied these statements based on fake news, but that did not stop their 
circulation in public discourse. The more liberal party then in power was attacked 
by Kaczyński for adopting a subservient stance toward the European Union when 
it agreed to accept more than seven thousand Syrian war refugees scheduled to be 
resettled from Greece and Italy (Buchowski 2017, 521).
After assuming power, the right-wing authorities quickly rejected this 
agreement. The minister of interior affairs insisted that the new government’s 
unyielding anti-immigrant policy guaranteed security to Poles, and therefore it 
adamantly refused to accept refugees relocated from the Mediterranean. Acting 
against international and domestic law, border guards also denied asylum seekers 
entry onto Polish territory, including Chechens and Tajiks escaping Presidents 
Kadyrov and Rahmon’s cruel dictatorships (Cieślewska and Szczepanik 2016). 
Jarosław Gowin, the deputy prime minister and minister of science and higher 
education, despite his declared religious piety, criticized Pope Francis for his 
refugee-friendly approach. Gowin, like many conservative Catholic Church 
officials in Poland, was concerned about the possible negative impact of “religious 
Aliens” on Polish society. At one point he said: “We should receive refugees, but 
they should not be Muslim believers. They do not assimilate” (cited from Legut 
and Pędziwiatr 2018, 47). Statements by top politicians and several bishops 
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paved the way for anti-Muslim slogans in the public sphere to be expressed 
freely by “true patriots” during street demonstrations, soccer games, and on 
social media. This was done in the name of freedom of speech unrestricted by a 
“blackmailing political correctness” (Konopka 2019, 46). Charges against culprits 
propagating ethnically, racially, or religiously motivated hate were often dismissed 
in the courts as unsubstantiated (Buchowski 2016, 60-61; 2017, 521). Several 
scholars documented this upsurge in anti-refugee, anti-Muslim, nationalist, and 
xenophobic discourse (Krzyżanowski 2016; Konopka 2019).
The positions of populist politicians, widely aired in the PiS-controlled 
public media, have brought about unprecedented changes in attitude in Poland 
towards refugees. Research results illustrate this process. Bart Bachman has 
written that “data from the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2012 show 
that Poles consistently held some of the most pro-immigration views in Europe, 
expressing similar views towards refugees and asylum seekers… Poles agreed or 
strongly agreed that their government ‘should be generous judging applications 
for refugee status’.” With 63.4 percent having a positive attitude towards them, “it 
was a more positive response than voiced by Swedes (60.3 percent) and Germans 
(38.8 percent)” (Bachman 2016). In mid-2015, 63.9 percent of Poles were still 
ready to accept refugees from European countries and 52 percent from non-
European ones (Andriejuk 2015, 11). Opinion polls attest that the number of 
those rejecting refugees from the Middle East and Africa in Poland rose from 30 
percent in 2013 to 48 percent in September 2015 and again to 74 percent in April 
2017, and that those ready to receive and allow refugees to settle in Poland ranged 
between 2 and 5 percent (CBOS 2017, 2). A decisive majority of Poles, ranging 
between 55 and 76 percent, approve violent solutions towards asylum seekers 
(Świderska, Winiewski, and Hansen 2016, 7). The findings of Pew researchers 
show that 66 percent of Poles had an unfavorable view of Muslims, which ranks 
them third among European nations, just after Hungarians (72 percent) and 
Italians (69 percent), and before Greeks (65 percent) and Spaniards (50 percent) 
(Wike, Stokes, and Simmons 2016).
These negative approaches often translate into violent acts. Hate speech 
is proliferating in Poland. The number of legal investigations of ethnically and 
racially motivated verbal (mostly online) or physical violence increased from 835 
in 2013 to 1,548 in 2015. Successive “Brown Books” (Brunatna Księga), which 
report cases of racially motivated crimes, compiled each year by the Never Again 
Association (see Kornak, Tatar, and Pankowski 2016), make us aware of the extent 
of this phenomenon. Racially inspired physical violence is being registered much 
more frequently than in the past. In just the four days during and after New Year’s 
Eve 2017, there were reports of two drunk youths in Ełk (north-east Poland) who 
yelled slurs at the owners of a kebab shop, who came from the Maghreb, and 
attempted to steal bottles of Coke. The ensuing brawl ended with the death of 
one of the offenders, resulting in riots during which the shop was demolished. In 
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Lubin (south-west), vandals destroyed a kebab shop owned by an Indian man and 
spray-painted it with vulgar anti-Muslim texts. Another kebab shop operated by 
a Kurdish man was attacked in Wrocław (south-west), an Indian restaurant was 
damaged in Szczecin (north-west), a Bengali man was beaten in Legnica (south-
west), and a Pakistani assaulted in Ozorków (central Poland). Thus, in this short 
period, six xenophobic attacks were reported across the country (see Buchowski 
2017, 519-20). Racially motivated and anti-Muslim violence has continued 
following the refugee crisis (Pędziwiatr 2017).
Discussion: Reasons for the Rising Tide of Xenophobia
That the range and extent of the changes relate to something that I call the 
“xenophobic turn” can hardly be denied. A comprehensive understanding of this 
trend requires thorough empirical research that will juxtapose diachronic and 
synchronic perspectives as well as pay attention to such factors as class belonging, 
education, religious affiliation, political preferences, and regional differences. It 
should also address the differences in declarations towards and actual relations 
with Others in everyday life. Here, on the basis of the data and facts reported 
above, I propose some preliminary answers to only some questions: Why has 
Polish society proven to be so vulnerable to xenophobic ideologies? What has 
caused this increase in intolerant, prejudiced, and particularly anti-Muslim 
attitudes in the last five years? What causes such a difference in standpoints 
towards victims of conflicts coming from various parts of the world and at 
different periods, in our case Chechnya and Syria? What triggered such a 
sweeping change in attitudes towards refugees in such a short time span? And 
finally, why are refugees, perceived as tantamount to Muslims, rejected, while 
Ukrainian labor migrants are accepted?
Historical Homogeneity 
First, at the end of World War II in 1945, the population of the country was 
homogenized in terms of both its ethnic and religious composition. For more 
than four decades, Poland was also relatively isolated. Emigration was limited 
but continued, and to a large extent comprised ethnic or religious minorities 
such as Germans (after postwar ethnic cleansing, Späteaussidlers from the 1970s 
and 1980s), Ukrainians (after World War II and 1956), and Jews (in the 1940s 
and1950s, and in 1968). Immigration to the country was virtually non-existent. 
The conjoined emigration of minorities and dearth of new immigrants not 
only reinforced the existing “monoculture,” but also caused further ethnic and 
religious uniformization of the society. This kind of homogeneity became the 
norm, an “obvious obviousness,” and on various occasions was actually praised. 
Superhomogeneity was taken for granted. It coincided with the conception of 
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an ideal nation state in which ethnic and political borders coincided, which 
in result, and in contrast to the former Yugoslavia or Ukraine, the three post-
Soviet Baltic states or Romania, “helped” to avoid ethnic conflicts during the 
turbulent historical transformations after 1989. For nationals in a monoethnic 
state, Others lived “somewhere out there,” as hypothetical beings. Several non-
European, “exotic” groups were, on the one hand, represented in a Eurocentric, 
patronizing perspective, while on the other hand, in official propaganda they 
were presented as people struggling with colonization and discrimination and 
in need of assistance. However, everyday encounters with foreigners, except for 
incidental and transient contacts with tourists and as tourists, were not an issue. 
Unquestioned national unity was not seen as endangered. In this mental milieu, 
refugees were perceived rather as sufferers of conflicts than as a potential threat 
to the nation. Their fate inspired compassion informed by images related to the 
Polish nation’s own tragic history of persecution and forced migrations. Moreover, 
the image of refugees was abstract, as they were practically nonexistent. In this 
setting, Muslim Chechens were also not associated in the first place with Islam, 
but instead with the brutal oppression they experienced by the eternally hostile, 
as many Poles think, Soviet/Russian empire.
Numerical Marginality of the Others: Between Tolerance and Antipathy
Second, in modern Polish history Muslims have always been numerically 
marginal. Their presence has been negligible not only in the post-World War 
II period. Despite the negative connotations the words “Islam” and “Muslims” 
have had for people in the present century as well as the antipathy expressed in 
opinion polls towards “Arabs,” Muslim communities which have been settled 
in the country for centuries or decades have not been subjected to exceptional 
public odium. Tatars have been seen as part of the national history and local 
folklore, tangible proof of the mythical Polish tolerance. Since the political leaders 
who grasped power in 2015 have stubbornly refused to accept any refugees in 
the relocation program for people living in the EU’s refugee camps, the number 
of Muslims has not changed since the critical year of the refugee crisis. However, 
a long-established resentment shown towards Muslims has not disappeared, 
existing somehow quiescently. Awakened in 2015, it stopped being “merely” a 
dormant case of phantom Islamophobia in which an antipathy towards “Muslims 
without Muslims” was shown. The compassion expressed towards generic 
refugees, among them Muslims, transformed into a rapid growth in hostility 
towards Muslim refugees escaping war in Syria.
Distant/Absent/Hostile Significant Others
Third, what was the reason for this conspicuous rise in verbal aggression and 
sometimes physical abuse? The right-wing populist political camp did not justify 
its rejection of refugees merely on the basis of an inadequate infrastructure for 
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their reception. Above all, it chose and developed it as a deliberate discursive 
strategy; a “governmentality” based on the stigmatization and securitization of 
Muslims (see Kaya 2011; Bobako 2017). Such a policy had several cornerstones. 
Above all, this was fear of the Other, which was relatively easy to stir up in 
Poland’s superhomogeneous society. The words of Kaczyński cited above 
exemplify this scheme. In the case discussed, “the threatening Other” is created 
as a distant, Oriental, exotic Other. Distant and at the same time Absent Others 
are represented as endangering “us,” even if only in theory, both physically, by 
bringing unknown diseases, and culturally, by altering our customs and even 
dress code, and colonizing our spaces, e.g., turning “sacred for us Poles” churches 
into toilets. This strategy paid off thanks to existing—though for years rather 
passive, if not dormant—stereotypes about “Arabs” which, in a longue durée 
historical perspective have their roots in collective images about Muslim “infidels” 
and the role Poles played in history as defenders of Christian Europe, in the 
mythology of Poland as an Antemurale Christianitatis (see Davies 2005, 125-55, 
chapter 6: “Antemurale”), a bulwark of Christianity. This mythology implies a 
“frontier myth of Orientalism” (Gingrich 1998, 104), not uncommon in Austria, 
Hungary, and in some Balkan regions, one that was skillfully reinvigorated by 
populist authorities and their media outlets. It divides the world into “us” and 
“them,” utilizing a process known as “double negation” in which, in the first 
move, and as mentioned at the beginning, the Others are construed as people 
embodying all the negative attributes of “us,” and, in the second move, “we” are 
imagined as the ultimate opposite of the negative self-image. The refugees, now 
in public discourse synonymous with Muslims/Arabs, have started to stand “for 
that which is disliked, detested, abhorred and hated” (Schiffauer 2013, 106)—in 
brief, they are Significant Others. In typecasting Muslims as a renewed danger, 
the motif of Islamic terrorism has been conjured up in a country that has not 
witnessed any terrorist attack within its borders. This succeeded thanks to an 
intellectual operation known as pars pro toto. Terrorist attacks carried out by 
Muslim extremists have been attributed to all Muslims. Populist authorities 
have artfully frightened their fellow citizens, and in their posturing and claims 
to ensure security, they have rigidified their stand towards any non-labor 
immigrants and made this a token of their unequivocal policy towards refugees/
Muslims. This was used as an argument even in local elections in 2018. On 
a business trip on September 8 through the medium-sized city of Leszno, I 
documented a PiS banner on a roadside fence: “We keep our promises: Defending 
Poland against Islamization.”
Islamophobia is entangled in nationalist ideas. In this version of nationalism, 
the nation is reified. This implies that imports of alien people, cultures, habits, 
customs, and religious ideas pose a threat to its very existence and infringe upon 
its imagined unspoiled shape. Significant Others and at the same time Distant 
Others are made Hostile Others. These culturally alien people, who do not fit into 
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our culture, represent at the same time a belligerent religion, always inimical to 
“our” Christian faith and traditions.
Familiar Significant Others
Fourth, within this framework, Ukrainian labor immigrants are perceived 
differently, despite the fact that historical relations with them in the 20th century 
are presented by nationalists as full of atrocities and unsettled conflicts. In 
that sense, in some contexts and for some people, they feature as Significant 
Others. However, although the attitude towards them is not very favorable, 41 
percent express antipathy and 31 percent declare sympathy (CBOS 2019, 3), and 
xenophobic incidents involving Ukrainians are not uncommon, nothing similar 
to Islamophobia can be witnessed. Particularly in the rhetoric of politicians, 
economists, and the media, the justifications for their presence are pragmatic, 
even cynical. The migration of two and a half million Poles to more affluent 
countries in Europe has caused shortages in the domestic labor force. Letting 
in Ukrainians is meant to fill a gap in this market. The opinions of Piotr Bujak, 
an economic expert, are typical in this respect. He admits ingenuously that 
Ukrainian workers come from “a country which is geographically and culturally 
close. Ukrainians very easily adapt in Poland, they learn the language quickly, and 
this helps alleviate the social tensions related to immigration observable in other 
countries, and also allows for a swift attainment of positive economic effects.” He 
claims there are no reasons to complain about Poland’s immigration policy, which 
does not “encourage people to stay for a longer period or settle in Poland. Our 
approach to immigration helped us to achieve so-called effective immigration, 
people determined to work and whose workplace is often assured at the moment 
of their arrival, and this helps avoid migration-related problems known in other 
countries” (Business Insider 2019). Avoiding problems caused by refugees is 
emphasized twice in this twofold argument. First, unlike Muslims who “do not 
assimilate,” as the minister of higher education cited above thinks, Ukrainians do 
assimilate. By assimilating they do not endanger the nation’s essential character, 
especially since they are Christians and their language is similar to Polish. They 
are not Distant Others. In that sense, they are acceptable because of their cultural-
religious proximity and invisibility. Second, accepting Ukrainians facilitates 
economic growth and thus they actually help us to maintain the nation’s existence 
and its prosperity. Temporary permits should make it clear that their presence 
is not expected to be permanent and they are encouraged to leave after their 
contracts are completed. In contrast to Muslim refugees, who were depicted as a 
threat to the nation and kept away as invaders, Ukrainians are presented as useful 
transitory workers. This premise, and promise, placates the public.
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Conclusions
The above discussion leads us to a more general conclusion regarding the 
concept of Significant Others. In principle, Anna Triandafyllidou (2001) limits its 
application to ethnic and/or national groups. I claim that it should be extended to 
certain religious groups for at least three reasons: (1) the perception of Muslims is 
closely related to nationalism and collective self-representation, often intertwined 
with religious denomination, and has become conspicuous not only among 
Polish nationalists, but also European nationalists and right-wing populists (see 
Brubaker 2017); (2) Muslims, as shown above, are in fact perceived often in 
quasi-ethnic terms as “Arabs,” and because ordinary people do not deliberate over 
such categorical distinctions, these categories remain frequently blurred; and, (3) 
the mechanisms involved in making Significant (ethnic) Others and Significant 
(religious) Others are very similar.
Moreover, some distinctions within the category of Significant Others should 
be made. In Triandafyllidou’s (2001, 34) words, Significant Others are “groups 
that share common cultural, ethnic or territorial features with the nation” and 
as a rule are neighbors. Ukrainians in relation to Poles fully meet this standard. 
They are also not seen as a threat to identity. At the same time, “dissimilar 
outgroups are already distinctive from the ingroup” (ibid., 34), and there is no 
need to differentiate oneself from them. In European countries that have accepted 
immigrants for decades, Muslims have become relevant internal Significant 
Others posing a threat to identity “from within.” However, in the Polish case 
they are Distant, and in fact Absent and Unknown Significant Others who do 
not share much with “us,” but are nevertheless perceived as relevant external 
agents threatening Polish identity. Therefore, I think that cultural similarity and 
territorial proximity are not decisive for a group to be perceived as Significant 
Others. If we accept this, then a distinction into “Distant” and “Familiar” 
Significant Others is justified.
Notes
1. The 1,468,000 people claiming “non-Polish” identity comprised those declaring a 
nationality other than Polish or a dual nationality that could include Polish.
2. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). OECD 
Databases on Migration. https://www1.compareyourcountry.org/migration/en/1/all/
default (accessed January 14, 2020).
3. For instance, in Luxemburg 48 percent of the population are foreigners, in Switzerland 
28 percent. Over 10 percent of the population is foreign-born in Cyprus, Austria, Estonia, 
Malta, Latvia, Belgium, Ireland, and Germany (see Eurostat, migr_pop3ctb); in the case of 
Latvia and Estonia, they are mostly post-Soviet Russian residents who have not obtained 
citizenship in the respective states. Data vary according to how statistics are “calibrated,” 
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but the overall number of immigrants of various statuses—temporary, permanent, labor, 
intra-European, and extra-European—is increasing systematically. In 2017 alone, 4.4 
million people migrated in the EU, and among them 2.4 million were immigrants from 
outside the EU countries (see Eurostat 2019).
4. They are so, even if one takes into account the 2018 International Religious Freedom 
Report, which provides different numbers—with 86 and 91.6 percent identifying as Roman 
Catholics (U.S. Department of State 2018).
5. There are 25.8 million Muslims living in Europe, which is on average 4.9 percent of 
the total population. However, these numbers vary from country to country; for instance, 
in Bulgaria the number is 11 percent, in France 8.8 percent, in Sweden 8.1 percent, in 
Austria 6.9 percent, in the UK 6.3 percent, and in Switzerland 6.1 percent (Pew Research 
Center 2017); in Bulgaria most of these Muslims are historical minorities of Turks and 
Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks. It should be added that in Europe beyond the EU borders, 
70 percent of the 3.4 million citizens in Albania are Muslims, or rather “people of Muslim 
origin” (Lederer 1994, 331), in Kosovo 93 percent (Ghaffar 2015, 159), ca.15–17 percent 
in Montenegro (Dimitrovova 2001, 95), 40 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 25–30 
percent in Macedonia (Barisic 2007, 2-7). Altogether, eight million Muslims live in the 
Balkans (ibid., 1).
6. I do not engage in a complex discussion of the meaning of this concept. For the 
purpose of this article, the definition given in a recent Runnymede Report is sufficiently 
operational: “Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion or restriction towards, or preference 
against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life” (Olahi and Khan 2017, 7).
7. Again, I do not intend to discuss the complex issue of populism in detail. It may 
simply be understood here as a concept that “in postmillennial politics, typically refers 
to right populism, which is characterized by emotionally-charged political appeals to 
addressing crises through neonationalism, masculinism, Othering, bordering, xenophobia, 
sexism, racism, phantasmatic ethnic golden-ageism, a disregard for liberal democratic 
norms, and so forth” (Gagnon et al. 2018, vi). 
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